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Abstract Morally judicious behavior forms the fabric of
human sociality. Here, we sought to investigate neural
activity associated with different facets of moral thought.
Previous research suggests that the cognitive and emotional
sources of moral decisions might be closely related to
theory of mind, an abstract-cognitive skill, and empathy, a
rapid-emotional skill. That is, moral decisions are thought
to crucially refer to other persons’ representation of
intentions and behavioral outcomes as well as (vicariously
experienced) emotional states. We thus hypothesized that
moral decisions might be implemented in brain areas
engaged in ‘theory of mind’ and empathy. This assumption
was tested by conducting a large-scale activation likeli-
hood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging
studies, which assessed 2,607 peak coordinates from 247
experiments in 1,790 participants. The brain areas that
were consistently involved in moral decisions showed
more convergence with the ALE analysis targeting theory
of mind versus empathy. More specifically, the neuroto-
pographical overlap between morality and empathy dis-
favors a role of affective sharing during moral decisions.
Ultimately, our results provide evidence that the neural
network underlying moral decisions is probably domain-
global and might be dissociable into cognitive and
affective sub-systems.
Keywords Moral cognition  Theory of mind (ToM) 
Empathy  Social cognition  Meta-analysis  ALE
Introduction
Moral behavior is a building block of human societies and
has classically been thought to be based on rational
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consideration. Aristotle (fourth century BC/1985), for
example, argued that being a ‘‘good person’’ requires rea-
soning about virtues. Kant’s (1785/1993) famous categor-
ical imperative was similarly rational, demanding that one
should act according to principles that could also become a
general law. More recently, Kohlberg et al. (1983) and
Kohlberg (1969) advanced a six-stage developmental
model acknowledging children’s increasing ability for
abstraction and role-taking capacities in moral decisions. In
contrast to rational models, the role of emotion in facili-
tating moral behavior has been less often emphasized
(Haidt 2001). Hume (1777/2006) provides an early notable
exception, as he believed in a key role of intuition for
recognizing morally good and bad decisions, not requiring
willful abstract reasoning. Charles Darwin (1874/1997)
further argued that moral decisions are mainly influenced
by emotional drives, which are rooted in socio-emotional
instincts already present in non-human primates.
Notions of rationality and emotionality also serve as
explanations in the contemporary neuroscientific literature
on the psychological processes underlying moral decisions
(henceforth: moral cognition). Results from functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies by Greene
et al. (2004) and Greene et al. (2001) were interpreted as
revealing a dissociation between fast emotional responses
and subsequent cognitive modulations in moral cognition.
FMRI findings by Moll and Schulkin (2009), Moll et al.
(2005a) and Moll et al. (2006), however, were interpreted
as revealing a dissociation between group-oriented (i.e.,
pro-social) and self-oriented (i.e., egoistic) affective drives
in moral cognition. Taken together, either abstract-infer-
ential or rapid-emotional processing has been emphasized
by most previous accounts explaining moral behavior.
Rational explanations assumed that moral behavior arises
from a conscious weighing of different rules, norms and
situational factors, while emotional explanations empha-
sized the influence of uncontrolled emotional states rapidly
evoked by a given situation (cf. Krebs 2008).
Previous evidence suggests that, the rational and emo-
tional facets of moral cognition are likely related to other
social skills: theory of mind (ToM) and empathy. ToM
refers to the ability to contemplate other’s thoughts, desires,
and behavioral dispositions by abstract inference (Premack
and Woodruff 1978; Frith and Frith 2003). Indeed, accu-
mulating evidence indicates that moral cognition is influ-
enced by whether or not an agent’s action is perceived as
intentional versus accidental (Knobe 2005; Cushman 2008;
Killen et al. 2011; Moran et al. 2011). Empathy, on the other
hand, refers to automatically adopting somebody’s emo-
tional state while maintaining the self–other distinction
(Singer and Lamm 2009; Decety and Jackson 2004). In
moral decisions, experiencing empathy was shown to
alleviate harmful actions towards others (Feshbach and
Feshbach 1969; Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992; Eisenberger
2000). Conversely, the deficient empathy skills in psycho-
pathic populations are believed to contribute to morally
inappropriate behavior (Hare 2003; Blair 2007; Soderstrom
2003). Taken together, moral cognition is thought to involve
the representation of intentions and outcomes as well as
(vicariously experienced) emotional states (Decety et al.
2012; Leslie et al. 2006; Pizarro and Bloom 2003). This
assumption is further supported by the observation that ToM
and empathic skills precede mature moral reflection in pri-
mate evolution (Greene and Haidt 2002) and in ontogeny
(Tomasello 2001; Kohlberg et al. 1983; Frith and Frith 2003;
Piaget 1932) given that natural evolution tends to modify
existing biological systems rather than create new ones from
scratch (Jacob 1977; Krebs 2008).
Notably, theoretical accounts as well as empirical evi-
dence suggest that ToM and empathy are partially overlap-
ping psychological constructs. In particular, it has been
proposed that embodied representations of affect, which
should be relevant for empathic processing, may be further
integrated into meta-representational or inferential process-
ing (Keysers and Gazzola 2007; Spengler et al. 2009; De
Lange et al. 2008; Mitchell 2005). That is, embodied repre-
sentation and meta-representation might not constitute two
mutually exclusive processes. In other words, more auto-
matic, bottom-up driven mapping and awareness of others
emotional states in the context of self–other distinction (i.e.,
empathy) might be modulated by more controlled, top-down
processes involved in attributing mind states (i.e., ToM)
(Leiberg and Anders 2006; Pizarro and Bloom 2003; Singer
and Lamm 2009). Importantly, ToM and empathy differ in
the representational content (mental states versus affect), yet
both might be similarly brought about by interaction between
top-down and bottom-up processes (Singer and Lamm 2009;
Lamm et al. 2007; Spengler et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2007). In
line with the theoretical arguments for a partial overlap
between ToM and empathy, ventromedial prefrontal cortex
lesions associated with ToM impairments were empirically
shown to debilitate elaborate forms of empathic processing,
while lateral inferior frontal cortex lesions, which leave ToM
skills intact, lead to an impairment of basic forms of
empathic processing (Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2009). In sum,
converging earlier evidence thus suggests that moral cog-
nition is subserved by partially interrelated ToM and
empathy processes.
From a neurobiological perspective, we therefore
hypothesized that moral cognition might be subserved by
brain areas also related to ToM and empathy, that is, brain
networks associated with abstract-inferential and rapid-
emotional processing, respectively. Furthermore, we sought
to formally investigate to what extent the neurobiological
correlates of ToM versus empathy overlap with the neural
network associated with moral cognition. Moreover, we
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tested whether a common set of brain areas might be
implicated in all three of these elaborate social-cognitive
skills. We addressed these questions by means of a quanti-
tative meta-analysis on peak coordinates reported in func-
tional neuroimaging studies on moral cognition, ToM, and
empathy.
Methods
Data used for the meta-analysis
We searched the PubMed database (http://www.pubmed.
org) for fMRI and PET studies that investigated the neural
correlates of moral cognition, ToM and empathy. Relevant
papers were found by keyword search (search strings:
‘‘moral’’, ‘‘morality’’, ‘‘norm’’, ‘‘transgression’’, ‘‘viola-
tion’’, ‘‘theory of mind’’, ‘‘mentalizing’’, ‘‘false belief’’,
‘‘perspective taking’’, ‘‘empathy’’, ‘‘empathic’’, ‘‘fMRI’’,
‘‘PET’’). Further studies were identified through review
articles and reference tracing from the retrieved papers.
Please note that in the context of ALE, the term ‘‘experi-
ment’’ usually refers to any single (contrast) analysis on
imaging data yielding localization information, while the
term ‘‘study’’ usually refers to a scientific publication
reporting one or more ‘‘experiments’’ (Laird et al. 2011;
Eickhoff and Bzdok 2012). The inclusion criteria comprised
full brain coverage as well as absence of pharmacological
manipulations, brain lesions or mental/neurological disor-
ders. Additionally, studies were only considered, if they
reported results of whole-brain group analyses as coordi-
nates corresponding to a standard reference space (Talai-
rach/Tournoux, MNI). That is, experiments assessing neural
effects in a priori defined regions of interest were excluded.
We included all eligible neuroimaging studies published up
to and including the year 2010. The exhaustive literature
search yielded in the moral cognition category a total of 67
experiments reporting 507 activation foci; in the ToM cat-
egory a total of 68 experiments reporting 724 activation foci,
and in the empathy category a total of 112 experiments
reporting 1,376 activation foci.
Methodologically equivalent to earlier ALE meta-anal-
yses (Spreng et al. 2009; Lamm et al. 2011; Bzdok et al.
2011; Fusar-Poli et al. 2009; Mar 2011), study selection
was grounded on the objective measure whether or not the
authors claimed to have isolated brain activity that relates
to moral cognition, ToM, or empathy. More specifically,
we only included those neuroimaging studies into the
‘‘morality’’ category that required participants to make
appropriateness judgments on actions of one individual
towards others. In these studies, participants passively
viewed or explicitly evaluated mainly textual, sometimes
pictorial social scenarios with moral violations/dilemmas.
The target conditions were frequently contrasted with
neutral or unpleasant social scenarios (see Supplementary
Table 1 for detailed study descriptions). Furthermore, we
only included those neuroimaging studies into the ‘‘ToM’’
category that required participants to adopt an intentional
stance towards others, that is, predict their thoughts,
intentions, and future actions. These studies mostly pre-
sented cartoons and short narratives that necessitated
understanding the beliefs of the acting characters. The
target conditions were usually contrasted with non-social
physical stories, which did not necessitate social perspec-
tive-taking. Finally, we only included those neuroimaging
studies into the ‘‘empathy’’ category that aimed at eliciting
the conscious and isomorphic experience of somebody
else’s affective state. Put differently, in these studies par-
ticipants were supposed to know and ‘‘feel into’’ what
another person was feeling. These studies employed mostly
visual, sometimes textual or auditory stimuli that conveyed
affect-laden social situations which participants watched
passively or evaluated on various dimensions.
Please note that we disregarded studies on empathy for
pain because pain, although possessing an affective
dimension, is not considered a classic emotion (Izard 1971;
Ekman 1982). Rather, it is a bodily sensation mediated by
distinct sensory receptors (Craig 2002; Saper 2000), and
watching painful scenes does not induce isomorphic
vicarious experiences (cf. Singer et al. 2004; Danziger
et al. 2009). In particular, looking at a happy person usually
elicits a sensation of happiness in the observer, yet
watching a person in pain usually does not likewise evoke
the physical experience of pain. Furthermore, we disre-
garded studies in which participants were presented with
emotion recognition tasks using static pictures of emotional
facial expressions. That is because such tasks are probably
too simple to reliably entail sharing others’ emotions and
maintaining a self–other distinction, both widely regarded
as hallmarks of empathy (Singer and Lamm 2009).
Methodological foundation of activation likelihood
estimation
The reported coordinates were analyzed for topographic
convergence using the revised ALE algorithm for coordi-
nate-based meta-analysis of neuroimaging results (Eickhoff
et al. 2009; Turkeltaub et al. 2002; Laird et al. 2009a). The
goal of coordinate-based meta-analysis of neuroimaging
data is to identify brain areas where the reported foci of
activation converge across published experiments. To this
end, the meta-analysis determines if the clustering is sig-
nificantly higher than expected under the null distribution
of a random spatial association of results from the con-
sidered experiments while acknowledging the spatial
uncertainty associated with neuroimaging foci.
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As the first step, reported foci were interpreted as cen-
ters for 3D Gaussian probability distributions that capture
the spatial uncertainty associated with each focus. This
uncertainty is mostly a function of between-template
(attributable to different normalization strategies and tem-
plates across laboratories) and between-subject (due to
small sample sizes) variance. In fact, the between-template
and between-subject variability are acknowledged based on
empirical estimates, the latter being additionally gauged by
individual sample size (Eickhoff et al. 2009).
In a second step, the probabilities of all activation foci in
a certain experiment were combined for each voxel,
yielding a modeled activation (MA) map (Turkeltaub et al.
2011). Voxel-wise ALE scores resulted from the union
across these MA maps and quantified the convergence
across experiments at each particular location in the brain.
The third and last step distinguished between random
and ‘true’ convergence by comparing the ensuing ALE
scores against an empirical null distribution reflecting a
random spatial association between the experiments’ MA
maps (Eickhoff et al. 2012). The within-experiment dis-
tribution of foci, however, was regarded to be fixed
(Eickhoff et al. 2009). Thus, a random-effects inference
was invoked, focusing on the above-chance convergence
across different experiments (Eickhoff et al. 2009; Caspers
et al. 2010; Kurth et al. 2010). The resulting ALE scores
were tested against the earlier calculated ‘true’ ALE scores
and cut off at a cluster-level-corrected threshold of
p \ 0.05. For cluster-level correction, the statistical image
of uncorrected voxel-wise p values was first cut off by the
cluster-forming threshold. Then, the size of the supra-
threshold clusters was compared against a null distribution
of cluster sizes derived from simulating 1,000 datasets with
the same properties (number of foci, uncertainty, etc.) as
the original experiments but random location of foci. The
p value associated with each cluster was then given by the
chance of observing a cluster of the given size in any
particular simulation.
Additional conjunction and difference analyses were
conducted to explore how different meta-analyses relate to
each other. Conjunction-analyses testing for convergence
between different meta-analyses employed inference by the
minimum statistic, i.e., computing the intersection of the
thresholded Z-maps (Caspers et al. 2010). That is, any
voxel determined to be significant by the conjunction
analysis constitutes a location in the brain which survived
inference corrected for multiple comparisons in each of the
individual meta-analyses. Difference analyses calculated
the difference between corresponding voxels’ ALE scores
for two sets of experiments. Then, the experiments con-
tributing to either analysis were pooled and randomly
divided into two analogous sets of experiments (Eickhoff
et al. 2011). Voxel-wise ALE scores for these two sets
were calculated and subtracted from each other. Repeating
this process 10,000 times yielded a null distribution of
recorded differences in ALE scores between two sets of
experiments. The ‘true’ difference in ALE scores was then
tested against these differences obtained under the null
distribution yielding voxel-wise p values for the difference.
These resulting non-parametric p values were thresholded
at p \ 0.001. Unfortunately, a statistical method to correct
for multiple comparisons when assessing the differences
between ALE maps has not yet been established. It should
be mentioned, however, that the randomization procedure
employed to compute the contrast between ALE-analyses
is in itself highly conservative as it estimates the proba-
bility for a true difference between the two datasets.
Functional characterization
The converging activation patterns of tasks requiring moral
cognition, theory of mind, or empathy were first determined
by ALE meta-analysis. The conjunction across all three
individual ALE analyses then yielded a computationally
derived seed region for functional characterisation through
quantitative correspondence with cognitive and experi-
mental descriptions of the BrainMap taxonomy. In fact,
BrainMap metadata describe the category of mental pro-
cesses isolated by the statistical contrast of each experiment
stored in the database (http://www.brainmap.org; Laird
et al. 2009a). More specifically, behavioral domains (BD)
include the main categories cognition, action, perception,
emotion, interoception, as well as their subcategories. The
respective paradigm classes (PC) categorize the specific
task employed (a complete list of BDs and PCs can be found
at http://www.brainmap.org/scribe/). We analyzed the
behavioral domain and paradigm class metadata of Brain-
Map experiments associated with seed voxels to determine
the frequency of domain ‘hits’ relative to its likelihood
across the entire database. Using a binomial test, Bonfer-
roni-corrected for multiple comparisons, the functional
roles of the convergent network as a whole were identified
by determining those BDs and PCs that showed a significant
over-representation in experiments activating within the
seed regions, relative to the entire BrainMap database
(Laird et al. 2009b; Eickhoff et al. 2011).
Results
Individual meta-analyses of moral cognition, theory
of mind, and empathy
All areas resulting from the ALE meta-analyses were
anatomically labeled by reference to probabilistic cytoar-
chitectonic maps of the human brain using the SPM
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Anatomy Toolbox (see Tables 1, 2; Eickhoff et al. 2007;
Eickhoff et al. 2005). Meta-analysis of neuroimaging
studies related to moral cognition yielded convergent
activation in the bilateral ventromedial/frontopolar/dor-
somedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC/FP/dmPFC), precuneus
(Prec), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC), as well as the right temporal pole (TP), right
middle temporal gyrus (MTG), and left amygdala (AM)
(Fig. 1; Table 1). Meta-analysis of studies related to ToM
revealed convergence in the bilateral vmPFC/FP/dmPFC,
Prec, TPJ, TP, MTG, posterior superior temporal sulcus
(pSTS), and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the
right MT/V5. Finally, meta-analysis of studies related to
empathy yielded convergence in the bilateral dmPFC,
supplementary motor area (SMA), rostral anterior cingulate
cortex (rACC), anterior mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC; cf.
Vogt 2005), PCC, anterior insula (AI), IFG, midbrain, and
TPJ, as well as the anterior thalamus on the left, further, the
AM, MTG, pSTS, posterior thalamus, hippocampus, and
pallidum on the right.
Conjunction analyses
We conducted three conjunction analyses to examine where
regions consistently involved in moral cognition converged
with regions consistently involved in ToM, empathy, or both
(Fig. 2; Table 2). In particular, we computed the conjunc-
tion across the individual meta-analysis of moral cognition
and the difference between the analyses of ToM and
empathy. Employing the difference excluded brain activity
shared by both ToM and empathy. The conjunction across
the neural network linked to moral cognition and the
Table 1 Peaks of activations for the brain areas consistently engaged
in fMRI studies on moral cognition, theory of mind, and empathy as
revealed by ALE meta-analysis
Macroanatomical location MNI coordinates
x y z
ALE meta-analysis of moral cognition
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 4 58 -8
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex -10 42 -18
Frontopolar cortex 0 62 10
Frontopolar cortex -6 52 18
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 0 54 36
Precuneus 0 -56 34
Right temporo-parietal junction (PGa, PGp) 62 -54 16
Left temporo-parietal junction (PGa, PGp) -48 -58 22
Right temporal pole 54 8 -28
Right middle temporal gyrus 54 -8 -16
Left amygdala -22 -2 -24
Posterior cingulate cortex -4 -26 34
ALE meta-analysis of theory of mind
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 0 52 -12
Frontopolar cortex 2 58 12
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex -8 56 30
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 4 58 25
Precuneus 2 -56 30
Right temporo-parietal junction (PGa, PGp) 56 -50 18
Left temporo-parietal junction (PGa, PGp) -48 -56 24
Right temporal pole 54 -2 -20
Left temporal pole -54 -2 -24
Right middle temporal gyrus 52 -18 -12
Left middle temporal gyrus -54 -28 -4
Left middle temporal gyrus -58 -12 -12
Right posterior superior temporal sulcus 50 -34 0
Left posterior superior temporal sulcus -58 -44 4
Right inferior frontal gyrus (Area 45) 54 28 6
Left inferior frontal gyrus -48 30 -12
Right MT/V5 48 -72 8
ALE meta-analysis of empathy
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 2 56 18
Table 1 continued
Macroanatomical location MNI coordinates
x y z
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex -8 54 34
Right anterior insula 36 22 -8
Left anterior insula -30 20 4
Right inferior frontal gyrus 50 12 -8
Right inferior frontal gyrus (Area 44) 54 16 20
Right inferior frontal gyrus (Area 45) 50 30 4
Left inferior frontal gyrus -44 24 -6
Supplementary motor area (Area 6) -4 18 50
Anterior mid-cingulate cortex -2 28 20
Rostral anterior cingulate cortex -4 42 18
Posterior cingulate cortex -2 -32 28
Right temporo-parietal junction (PGp) 52 -58 22
Left temporo-parietal junction (PGa) -56 -58 22
Right amygdala 22 -2 -16
Right middle temporal gyrus 54 -8 -16
Right posterior superior temporal sulcus 52 -36 2
Left anterior thalamus -12 -4 12
Right posterior thalamus 6 -32 2
Right hippocampus (SUB) 26 -26 -12
Midbrain 2 -20 -12
Right pallidum 14 4 0
All peaks are assigned to the most probable brain areas as revealed by
the SPM Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al. 2007; Amunts et al. 2005;
Geyer 2004; Caspers et al. 2006; Amunts et al. 1999; Eickhoff et al.
2005)
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activation more robustly linked to ToM versus empathy
revealed an overlap in the bilateral vmPFC/FP/dmPFC and
TPJ, as well as the right MTG and TP. Conversely, the
conjunction across the neural network linked to moral cog-
nition and the activation more robustly linked to empathy
versus ToM revealed an overlap in the dmPFC. Besides
results from this conjunction analysis, it is noteworthy that
the left AM was found in the analysis of moral cognition-
related brain activity, while the right AM was found in the
analysis of empathy-related brain activity. Moreover, the
PCC showed significant convergence in both these individ-
ual meta-analyses at adjacent, yet non-overlapping loca-
tions. Specifically, convergence in the PCC was located
slightly more rostro-dorsally in the ALE on moral cognition
compared to the ALE on empathy (Fig. 1; Table 1). Finally,
the conjunction analysis across the results of all three indi-
vidual meta-analyses on moral cognition, ToM, and empa-
thy yielded convergence in the dmPFC, right MTG, and
bilateral TPJ. Additionally, we provide a list of those papers
included in the present meta-analysis, which gave rise to the
four converging clusters (Supplementary Table 2).
Functional characterization
Using the metadata of the BrainMap database for functional
characterization as described above, we found that the
common network observed across all three task domains
was selectively associated with tasks tapping ToM,
semantic processing, imagination, and social cognition, as
well as episodic and explicit memory (Fig. 3). The network
thus appears to be exclusively involved in higher-level
cognitive processing.
Discussion
Classic accounts of the psychology of moral cognition can
be broadly divided into views that emphasize the involve-
ment of either ‘rational’ or ‘emotional’ processes. In this
study, we revisited this distinction by determining the
consistent overlap between brain activation patterns
Table 2 Conjunction analyses that test for topographical conver-
gence between the individual ALE meta-analyses of moral cognition,
theory of mind, and empathy
Macroanatomical location MNI coordinates
x y z
Morality \ (theory of mind–empathy)
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 2 54 -12
Frontopolar cortex 4 60 10
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 0 54 30
Right temporo-parietal junction (PGa) 62 -54 14
Left temporo-parietal junction (PGa, PGp) -50 -58 22
Right middle temporal gyrus 54 -16 -16
Right temporal pole 54 2 -24
Morality \ (empathy–theory of mind)
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex -4 50 20
Morality \ theory of mind \ empathy
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex -5 54 34
Right temporo-parietal junction (PGp) 52 -58 20
Left temporo-parietal junction (PGa) -54 -58 22
Right middle temporal gyrus 54 -8 -16
All peaks are assigned to the most probable brain areas as revealed by
the SPM Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al. 2007; Caspers et al. 2006;
Eickhoff et al. 2005)
Fig. 1 ALE meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on moral cogni-
tion, theory of mind, and empathy. Significant meta-analysis results
displayed on frontal, right, and left surface view as well as sagittal,
coronal, and axial sections of the MNI single-subject template.
Coordinates in MNI space. All results were significant at a cluster-
forming threshold of p \ 0.05 and an extent threshold of k = 10
voxels (to exclude presumably incidental results)
788 Brain Struct Funct (2012) 217:783–796
123
reported in the neuroscientific literature on moral cognition
with those of ToM (assumed to be more rational) and
empathy (assumed to be more emotional) using coordinate-
based ALE meta-analysis. By doing so, we demonstrated
that moral cognition, indeed, recruits brain areas that are
also involved in abstract-inferential (ToM) and rapid-
emotional (empathy) social cognition. Furthermore, TPJ,
mPFC, and MTG emerged as potential nodes of a network
common to moral cognition, ToM, and empathy.
Individual analyses on the neural correlates of moral
cognition, theory of mind, and empathy
To our knowledge, we here conducted the first quantitative
meta-analytic assessment of the neural network engaged in
moral cognition, that is, reflection of the social appropri-
ateness of people’s actions. The obtained pattern of con-
verged brain activation is in very good agreement with
qualitative reviews of fMRI studies on moral cognition
(Moll et al. 2005b; Greene and Haidt 2002). Concurrently,
dysfunction in prefrontal, temporal and amygdalar regions
is discussed as linked to psychopathy and anti-social
behavior based on neuropsychological, lesion, and fMRI
studies (Blair 2007; Anderson et al. 1999; Mendez et al.
2005).
The results of the meta-analysis of ToM were consistent
with earlier quantitative analyses (Spreng et al. 2009; Mar
2011) of neuroimaging studies, in which participants
attributed mental states to others to predict or explain their
behavior. Put differently, the obtained network is likely to
be implicated in the recognition and processing of others’
mental states (Amodio and Frith 2006; Gallagher and Frith
2003; Schilbach et al. 2010).
The meta-analysis on empathy across various affective
modalities excluding pain was based on neuroimaging
studies in which participants understood and vicariously
shared the emotional experience of others. This analysis
revealed the aMCC extending into the SMA and the AI
extending into the IFG as the most prominent points of
convergence. This is in line with a recent image-based
meta-analysis on empathy for pain (Lamm et al. 2011). The
present analysis on non-pain empathy, however, addition-
ally revealed activation in the AM, rACC, and PCC.
Consequently, empathy for pain- and non-pain-related
affect appears to be implemented by an overlapping net-
work that might recruit supplementary areas/networks
depending on the specific affective modality with which
participants are to empathize. In other words, the observed
network is likely to be involved in vicariously experiencing
others’ affective states (Singer et al. 2004; Wicker et al.
2003).
It is noteworthy that all brain areas revealed by the
meta-analysis on moral cognition also converged sig-
nificantly in the analyses on either ToM or empathy. It
is thus tempting to speculate that moral cognition might
rely on remodeling mental states and processing affec-
tive states of other people. Conversely, some of the
brain areas, which show significant convergence in
the ALE on ToM and empathy, were not significant in
the ALE on moral cognition. This suggests that moral
cognition might be realized by specific subsets, rather
than the entirety of the neural correlates of ToM and
empathy.
Fig. 2 Conjunction analyses for topographical convergence across
brain activity related to moral cognition and theory of mind (ToM) or
empathy. Left panel overlapping activation patterns between the
meta-analysis on moral cognition and the difference analysis between
ToM and empathy (cluster-forming threshold: p \ 0.05). Right
bottom panel overlapping activation patterns between the meta-
analysis on moral cognition and the difference analysis between
empathy and ToM (cluster-forming threshold: p \ 0.05). Right top
panel sagittal and coronal slices of juxtaposed results from the meta-
analyses on moral cognition (green) and empathy (red) to highlight
similar convergence in the posterior cingulate cortex and amygdala
(extent threshold: k = 10 voxels to exclude presumably incidental
results). Coordinates in MNI space
Brain Struct Funct (2012) 217:783–796 789
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Converging neural correlates across moral cognition
and theory of mind
Brain activity during moral cognition and ToM overlapped
in the bilateral vmPFC/FP/dmPFC and TPJ, as well as the
right TP and MTG. This extensive convergence indicates
that moral cognition and ToM engage a highly similar neural
network, which, in turn, entices to speculate about a close
relationship between these two psychological processes.
More specifically, increased activity along the dorso-ventral
axis of the medial prefrontal cortex is heterogeneously
discussed to reflect cognitive versus affective processes
(Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2006), controlled/explicit versus
automatic/implicit social cognition (Lieberman 2007; For-
bes and Grafman 2010), goal versus outcome pathways
(Krueger et al. 2009), dissimilarity versus similarity to self
(Mitchell et al. 2006) as well as other-focus versus self-focus
(Van Overwalle 2009). Apart from that, the spatially largest
convergence across moral cognition- and ToM-related brain
activity in the bilateral posterior temporal lobe/angular gyrus
might be surprising given the divergent interpretation in the
literature. That is, activation in this cortical region is con-
ventionally interpreted as ‘‘posterior superior temporal sul-
cus’’ in the morality literature (Moll et al. 2005b; Greene and
Haidt 2002) and as ‘‘temporo-parietal junction’’ in the ToM
literature (Decety and Lamm 2007; Van Overwalle 2009;
Saxe and Kanwisher 2003). This convergent activation in the
ALE on moral cognition is, however, more accurately
located to the TPJ, rather than to the pSTS (cf. Raine and
Yang 2006; Binder et al. 2009). The potentially inconsistent
neuroanatomical labeling might have disadvantageously
affected discussion of this brain area in previous neuroim-
aging studies on moral cognition.
The engagement of ToM-associated areas during moral
cognition has also been addressed in several recent fMRI
studies by Young, Saxe, and colleagues. These authors
proposed that during moral cognition, the dmPFC might
process belief valence, while the TPJ and Prec might
encode and integrate beliefs with other relevant features
(Young and Saxe 2008). Especially, brain activity in the
right TPJ was advocated to reflect belief processing during
moral cognition. This argument was based on interaction
effects with moral reasoning (Young et al. 2007), correla-
tion with the participants’ self-reported tendency for
acknowledging belief information (Young and Saxe 2009),
and a significantly reduced impact of intentions after
transient TPJ disruption (Young et al. 2010b). In line with
our results, these fMRI studies suggest that moral cognition
Fig. 3 Functional characterization of the core-network implicated in
moral cognition, theory of mind (ToM), and empathy. Left neural
network consistently activated across individual meta-analyses on
moral cognition, ToM, and empathy (extent threshold: k = 10 voxels
to exclude presumably incidental results). Images were rendered
using Mango (multi-image analysis GUI, Research Imaging Institute,
San Antonio, Texas, USA; http://ric.uthscsa.edu/mango/). Right
functional characterization of the convergent network across all three
tasks by BrainMap metadata. The purple bars denote the number of
foci for that particular metadata class within the seed network. The
grey bars represent the number of foci that would be expected to hit
the particular seed network if all foci with the respective class were
randomly distributed throughout the cerebral cortex. That is, the grey
bars denote the by-chance frequency of that particular label given the
size of the cluster. All shown taxonomic classes reached significance
according to a binomial test (p \ 0.05). Asterisks denote classes that
survived the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons
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might involve reconstructing attributes and intentions that
we apply to others and vice versa.
However, earlier neuroimaging evidence concerning the
likely implication of the ToM network in moral cognition
has two weak points. First, the interpretations of relevant
fMRI studies were largely driven by reverse inference, i.e.,
identifying psychological processes from mere topography
of brain activity (Poldrack 2006). That is, rather than
investigating moral cognition tasks alone, the neural net-
works of moral cognition and ToM should have been
compared directly by independent conditions involving
either task. Second, the relevant fMRI studies crucially
hinge on the repeatedly criticized functional localizer
technique, which rests on strong a priori hypotheses
(Friston et al. 2006; Mitchell 2008). The present ALE
meta-analysis overcomes these two limitations by a largely
hypothesis-free assessment of two independent pools of
numerous whole-brain neuroimaging studies, providing
strong evidence for the high convergence across the neural
networks associated with moral cognition and ToM.
Converging neural correlates across moral cognition
and empathy
Brain activity related to both moral cognition and non-pain
empathy converged significantly in an area of the dmPFC,
which was not revealed by the ALE on ToM. Converging
activation of the dmPFC may suggest an implication of this
highly associative cortical area in more complex social-
emotional processing. In line with this interpretation, a
recent fMRI study identified a similar brain location as
highly selective for processing guilt (Wagner et al. 2012),
an emotion closely related to moral and social transgres-
sion (Tangney et al. 2007). Moreover, the dmPFC has
consistently been related to the (possibly interwoven)
reflection of own and simulation of others’ mind states
(Lamm et al. 2007; Jenkins and Mitchell 2010; Mitchell
et al. 2006; D’Argembeau et al. 2007). Nevertheless, we
feel that it might be currently unwarranted to confer precise
functions to circumscribed parts of the dmPFC (cf. above),
given the danger of reverse inference when deducing
mental functions or states from regional activation patterns
(Poldrack 2006). We therefore cautiously conclude that the
observed convergence in the dmPFC probably reflects an
unidentified, yet to be characterized, higher-level neural
process that is related to affective and social processing.
It is interesting to note that the AM was significantly
involved in the individual ALEs on morality and non-pain
empathy, although in contralateral hemispheres. This brain
region is thought to automatically extract biological sig-
nificance from the environment (Ball et al. 2007; Sander
et al. 2003; Bzdok et al. 2011; Mu¨ller et al. 2011). In
particular, AM activity typically increases in the left
hemisphere in elaborate social-cognitive processes and in
the right hemisphere in automatic, basic emotional pro-
cesses (Phelps et al. 2001; Bzdok et al. 2012; Markowitsch
1998; Gla¨scher and Adolphs 2003). This lateralization
pattern thus seems well in line with the consistent
engagement of the left AM in moral cognition and right
AM in non-pain empathy. Moreover, activity in the PCC
was found in adjacent, yet non-overlapping, locations
during moral cognition and non-pain empathy. The PCC is
thought important for the modality-independent retrieval of
autobiographical memories and their integration with cur-
rent emotional states (Fink et al. 1996; Maddock et al.
2001; Maddock 1999; Schilbach et al. 2008a). It might
therefore be speculated that moral judgments and empathic
processing could both rely on the integration on past
experiences. Given that both PCC clusters do not overlap,
however, it remains to be investigated whether (a) moral
cognition and non-pain empathy engage distinct regions in
the PCC, (b) the observed topographic pattern is purely
incidental given the limited spatial resolution of meta-
analyses, or (c) the differences in PPC activation reflect
differences in stimulus-material and hence autobiographic
associations.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the AI/IFG and
aMCC/SMA were revealed as the most significant points of
convergence in the ALE on non-pain empathy but did not
show any overlap with the ALE on morality. In particular,
the AI/IFG and aMCC/SMA form a network that is widely
believed to represent one’s own and others’ emotional
states regardless of the actual affective or sensory modality
(Lamm et al. 2011; Wicker et al. 2003; Singer et al. 2004;
Lamm and Singer 2010; Fan et al. 2011). Moreover, this
network, especially the anterior insula, is not only impli-
cated in meta-representation of emotional states but also in
interoceptive awareness (Craig 2002, 2009; Kurth et al.
2010). Interoception-related meta-representation of emo-
tion has thus been suggested to underlie the concomitant
involvement of the aMCC/SMA and AI/IFG in neuroim-
aging studies on empathy as reflecting affective sharing
(Singer and Lamm 2009; Fan et al. 2011).
In summary, we draw three conclusions from these
observations. First, affective sharing, one core aspect of
empathy, is unlikely to be involved in moral judgments,
given the lack of consistent involvement of the AI/IFG or
aMCC/SMA in paradigms probing the latter. Second,
general affective processes might play a role in both moral
judgments and empathy, given that the respective meta-
analyses individually revealed the dmPFC (direct overlap)
and the amygdala (oppositely lateralized). Third, the neural
correlates of moral judgments are much closer related to
the neural correlates of ToM than to those of empathy, as
evidenced by the quantity of overlap in the conjunction
analyses.
Brain Struct Funct (2012) 217:783–796 791
123
Converging neural correlates across all individual
analyses
Moral cognition-, ToM-, and empathy-related brain activ-
ity converged in the bilateral TPJ, dmPFC, and right MTG,
which therefore form a common network potentially
involved in social-cognitive processes. In line with this,
metadata profiling demonstrates solid associations of this
network with neuroimaging studies related to ToM, explicit
memory retrieval, language, and imagination of objects/
scenes. Intriguingly, these four seemingly disparate psy-
chological categories summarize what sets humans proba-
bly apart from non-human primates (Tomasello 2001; Frith
and Frith 2010). They might functionally converge in the
reciprocal relationship between the allocentric and ego-
centric perspective, instructed by self-reflection, social
knowledge, and memories of past experiences (of social
interactions). In particular, autobiographical memory sup-
plies numerous building blocks of social semantic knowl-
edge (Bar 2007; Binder et al. 2009). These isolated
conceptual scripts may be reassembled to enable the fore-
casting of future events (Tulving 1983, 1985; Schacter
et al. 2007). Similar brain mechanisms in remembering
past episodes and envisioning future circumstances is
supported by their engagement of identical brain areas, as
evidenced by a quantitative meta-analysis (Spreng et al.
2009). Moreover, retrograde amnesic patients were repor-
ted to be impaired not only in prospection but also in
imagining novel experience (Hassabis et al. 2007). These
findings suggest a single neural network for mentally
constructing plausible semantic scenarios of detached sit-
uations regardless of temporal orientation (Buckner and
Carroll 2007; Hassabis and Maguire 2007). Indeed, con-
struction of detached probabilistic scenes has been argued
to influence ongoing decision making by estimating out-
comes of behavioral choices (Boyer 2008; Suddendorf and
Corballis 2007; Schilbach et al. 2008b). Taken together,
moral cognition, ToM, and empathy jointly engage a net-
work that might be involved in the automated prediction of
social events that modulate behavior.
Relation to clinical research
Consistent with the demonstrated functional dissociation
between cognitive and affective subsystems of the neural
network related to moral cognition observed in our study,
frontotemporal dementia has been reported to impair per-
sonal but not impersonal moral reasoning (Mendez et al.
2005). A cognitive-affective dissociation of moral cognition
is also supported clinically by the psychopathic popula-
tion’s immoral behavior in everyday life despite excellent
moral reasoning skills (Cleckley 1941; Hare 1993). Apart
from that, neither Greene’s nor Moll’s concept can
exhaustively explain why vmPFC patients demonstrated a
rationally biased approach to solving moral dilemmas
(Koenigs et al. 2007; Moretto et al. 2010), yet, an emo-
tionally biased approach to moral cognition in an economic
game (Koenigs and Tranel 2007). Given the considerable
neural commonalities of moral cognition and ToM tasks as
revealed by the present analysis, contradictory findings of
vmPFC patients dealing with moral dilemmas and eco-
nomic games (Greene 2007; Koenigs and Tranel 2007;
Koenigs et al. 2007) might resolve when meticulously
probing ToM capabilities in future lesion studies.
Limitations
Several limitations of our study should be addressed. Meta-
analyses are necessarily based on the available literature
and hence may be affected by the potential publication-bias
disfavoring null results (Rosenthal 1979). This caveat
especially applies to the functional characterization of
converging activation foci using the BrainMap database, as
this database only contains about 21% of the published
neuroimaging studies and its content therefore does not
constitute a strictly representative sample. Furthermore, a
part of the included neuroimaging studies on moral cog-
nition might suffer from limited ecological validity. That
is, the experimental tasks used might only partially involve
the mental processes guiding real-life moral behavior (cf.
Cima et al. 2010; Knutson et al. 2010; Young et al. 2010a).
In particular, employing overly artificial moral scenarios
(e.g., trolley dilemma), on top of the inherent limitations of
neuroimaging paradigms, could have systematically over-
estimated cognitive versus emotional processes. This
caveat might have contributed to the similar results in the
meta-analyses on moral cognition and on ToM (rather than
on empathy), given that emotion processing is thought to
play a paramount role in real-world moral cognition (Krebs
2008; Tangney et al. 2007; Haidt 2001). Future neuroim-
aging studies should therefore strive for using more real-
istic moral scenarios to minimize the risk of investigating
the neural correlates of ‘‘in vitro moral cognition’’ (cf.
Schilbach et al. 2012; Schilbach 2010).
Conclusions
It is a topic of intense debate whether social cognition is
subserved by a unitary specialized module or by a set of
general-purpose mental operations (Mitchell 2006; Spreng
et al. 2009; Bzdok et al. 2012; Van Overwalle 2011). The
present large-scale meta-analysis provides evidence for a
domain-global view of moral cognition, rather than for a
distinct moral module (Hauser 2006), by showing its
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functional integration of distributed brain networks. More
specifically, we parsed the neural correlates of moral
cognition by reference to a socio-cognitive framework,
exemplified by ToM cognition, and a socio-affective
framework, exemplified by empathy. Ultimately, our
results support the notion that moral reasoning is related to
both seeing things from other persons’ points of view and
to grasping others’ feelings (Piaget 1932; Tomasello 2001;
Decety et al. 2012).
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